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Spotlight

10x Genomics patent revoked

NanoString Technologies Europe Limited v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (UPC 252/2023) Decision of 17 October, 2024 (ORD_598480/2023[1]) This decision from the Central Division in Munich relates to EP2794928 belonging to President and Fellows of Harvard College, of which 10x Genomics is the licensee. 10x Genomics was refused a provisional injunction against NanoString on the basis of this patent (reported here[2]) – the Munich local division had doubts about the validity of the patent at least according to the claims as granted, and was not convinced that it was actually infringed. NanoString Technologies Europe Limited filed a revocation action against the patent at the UPC at the Munich Central Division on 27 July 2023. There was already pending a national revocation action in Germany related to the same patent, filed on 29 July 2022 by NanoString Technologies Germany GmbH. Lis Pendens The patent proprietor objected to the action on the basis of the lis pendens rules with respect to the prior German action. This objection was withdrawn at the oral hearing, but the Court considered that it was under obligation to nevertheless examine its international jurisdiction of its own motion since this was required under the Brussels I recast Regulation. Since the claimants in the UPC and German actions were not the same company, the Court considered that the situation did not fall under Article 29 of the Brussels I recast Regulation, which would require a mandatory stay. Instead, the case fell under the “related actions” provisions of Article 30 of the Brussels I recast Regulation, in which a stay is discretionary. The Court exercised its discretion to proceed with the action and not order a stay, because it had been requested to do so by the parties who stated their wish to have legal certainty as soon as possible. Moreover, the proceedings were at an advanced stage and the case was ready for a decision, so the procedural benefit of a stay at this stage would be limited, while a decision from the German Bundesgerichtshof was not expected for at least a year. In addition, a stay would cause delay in respect of the countries covered by the patent other than Germany; while it would be possible in principle to stay only the German part of the UPC action, this would have little benefit in terms of procedural economy. Validity The Court construed the claim more broadly than contended for by the proprietor, and on that basis it considered that the claims as granted lacked novelty over the prior art of Göransson. This is a similar conclusion to that in the provisional injunction proceedings. In particular, the Court construed the term “sample” broadly according to the description of the patent. It rejected the proprietor’s argument that Göransson does not disclose the detection of analytes “in a sample” because the sample is genomic DNA and in Göransson it is not this genomic DNA that is fixed on the slides, but only laboratory-amplified fragments derived from the genomic DNA (termed ASMs) – the Court considered that the term “sample” in the claims was broad enough to include ASMs prepared from genomic DNA and fixed on a microscopic slide as disclosed by Göransson. The Court consider eight auxiliary requests lodged with the defence to revocation, but declined to admit the further auxiliary requests filed later. Each of the eight auxiliary requests considered were acknowledged to be novel with regard to Göransson, but were considered to lack inventive step. The UPC noted that it had come to same conclusion as the Bundespatentgericht on essentially similar grounds. It was also noted that the conclusion was substantively in line with the findings of the UPC Court of Appeal in the NanoString/10x Genomics appeal which dealt with similar issues in respect of a related patent.[3] Accordingly, the Court ordered that the patent be revoked in its entirety. [1] https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1200 [2] https://eip.com//knowledge_hub/article/10x_genomics_not_successful_second_time_around/ [3] https://eipamar.com/en/knowledge_hub/article/why_did_the_court_of_appeal_reverse_the_local_division_injunction_in_10x_genomics_vs_nanostring/

Philips successfully asserts wireless charging patent at the UPC

Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Belkin GmbH, Belkin Limited, Belkin International, Inc. (UPC_CFI_390/2023) Decision of 13 September 2024 (ORD_598464/2023)[1] Philips asserted their patent EP 2867997[2], relating to wireless charging, against Belkin at the Munich local division of the UPC. The UPC found the patent both valid and infringed. The Qi wireless charging standard defines interactions between a power transmitter and a power receiver. According to the prior art standard, there was a mandatory configuration phase initiated by the power receiver. The patent in suit in this case provides for an additional ‘negotiation phase’ which can be requested by the power receiver. Claim 20 (directed to the power transmitter) includes the limitation: “means for acknowledging … by transmitting an acknowledgement … being indicative of an accept or rejection of the request […]” The ‘request’ here relates to the request to enter the negotiation phase. The issue of infringement hinged on whether a device which only ever transmitted an acknowledgement which indicated ‘accept’ (and never sent a ‘reject’) was within the scope of the claim. The defendant argued that the acknowledgement must be capable of indicating both accept and reject. The court found in favour of the claimant’s broader construction, based on an extensive review of the patent specification. This discloses an example (paragraph 46) where it is mandatory, for a transmitter which supports the negotiation phase, to accept a request for that phase. It also discloses (paragraphs 172-173) various examples where no negotiation phase occurs: the receiver does not request negotiation; the receiver requests negotiation, but the transmitter does not support it, and sends an explicit rejection; the transmitter does not support the feature and ignores, without responding, any request. The receiver assumes, from the absence of any response, that the transmitter does not support the request; and the transmitter supports the feature but elects to “fall back to a [legacy] power transmission strategy (and associated communication strategy)”. The court understood that in case 4), this meant that the transmitter appeared to behave as in case 3), i.e., no response is transmitted at all (and therefore could not be within the scope of the claim in any case, because there is no acknowledgement at all). The court used a two-step approach to understand the claim scope: Does the description describe the possibility that an acknowledgement might only indicate ‘accept’? If yes, does the claim reflect such an embodiment? Based on the example in paragraph 46, the answer to question 1 was ‘yes’. To answer the second question, the court stated that the correct approach was to read the claim together with the description and figures; the claim must be understood so that there are no contradictions between the claim and the description. The paragraph 46 embodiment must only be considered excluded from the claim scope if it was clear from the claim that something different was claimed. The court nevertheless emphasized that the wording of the patent claim takes precedence over the description. The court considered that the plain reading of the claim did not require the claimed transmitter to be capable of sending a rejection in response to the request. There being nothing in the specification to counter this presumption, the court found that it was not necessary for a transmitter to have means for sending an acknowledgement indicating ‘reject’. On this basis, the claim was infringed. Commentary Courts in Germany (LG Dusseldorf and the BPG/Federal Patent Court) had previously concluded that the transmitter must be able to send both accept and reject responses. In the present judgment, the question addressed is whether or not it is mandatory for an infringing device to be capable of sending a rejection. However, the claim refers to an “acknowledgement … being indicative of an accept or rejection”. It is not clear why the focus was on whether ‘being indicative of’ was a limitation of the substance of the actual response(s) sent by the transmitter, rather than a limitation of the format of the acknowledgement. In particular, the court does not appear to address the following question: Would a device which always sent an ‘accept’ acknowledgement infringe the claim if the format of the acknowledgement (as specified by the Qi standard) also allowed for a rejection? In any case, the UPC local division did not consider that the claim language itself inherently required the possibility of both alternatives. However, in hypothetical analogous claims to a ‘vehicle capable of travelling forwards or in reverse’ or ‘an indicator indicative of a forward or reverse gear’, it seems readily apparent that ‘or’ represents mutually exclusive options which must nevertheless both be satisfied (“conjunctive OR”). Instead, the court gave significant weight to the example of paragraph 46 and construed the claim explicitly with the effect of including that example within the claim scope. Before describing the example in which it is mandatory for transmitters to accept any request for the negotiation phase, paragraph 46 also discloses that “In some embodiments, it may also be optional between negotiation phase capable devices, and may possibly only be entered if desired by the power receiver. Although the negotiation phase will be optional, it may be mandatory that new devices support it.”. The skilled person may understand from this that devices (including power transmitters) could have the possibility to avoid the negotiation phase in at least some cases, consistent with the need for an acknowledgement capable of indicating both accept and reject. This would appear consistent with the ‘conjunctive OR’ interpretation. Paragraph 46 forms part of the ‘Summary of the invention’ section. This section begins at paragraph 41: “According to an aspect of the invention there is provided method of operation …according to claim 1 comprising …”. However, the remainder of that paragraph does not reflect the granted claim, but rather the independent claim in the application as filed (see WO 2014/001983 A1) and does not include the ‘accept or rejection’ limitation. The patent was published in 2016. Since then, practice at the EPO has evolved to require applicants to amend the description (and, particularly, the ‘Summary of invention’ section) to be more strictly aligned with the claims. In this case, it is unlikely that the granted patent would have included paragraphs 41 and 46 in their current form, had such an alignment been carried out. The conclusion of the court might, in such case, have been quite different. Conclusion Applicants should take care that, in complying with a request for aligning the claims and description, unintended consequences for claim construction cannot arise. In court proceedings, parties should be alive to whether or not such alignment has been carried out, and whether this should be taken into account in claim construction. [1] https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1087 [2] Prosecution history: https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP13759578&lng=en&tab=doclist

Intervention by patent pool administrator permitted

NEC Corporation v TCL Communication Technology Holdings Ltd. & Others (UPC_CFI_153/2024) Order dated 2 October 2024 (ORD_46842/2024)[1] NEC Corporation (“NEC”) sued seven companies within the TCL group (“TCL”) for infringement of EP 2,863,637 (the “Patent”). TCL counterclaimed for revocation. NEC had contributed the Patent to an HEVC patent pool administered by Access Advance LLC (the “Applicant”). The Applicant is authorised to grant licences under patents within the pool to third parties. The Applicant applied to intervene in the proceedings. The Applicant has unsuccessfully been trying to negotiate a licence of the pool with TCL. It had entered into a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) with TCL covering the negotiations and cannot share details of these with NEC. In support of the intervention the Applicant argued that it has a genuine legal interest: to support NEC in opposing allegations that the Applicant has not offered a FRAND licence and is in breach of article 102 TFEU; and also that the Court determines the Patent to be valid and infringed. TCL objected to the application to intervene. NEC had no objection. Decision The Munich local division allowed the intervention because it meets the formal requirements of Rule 313.1, 313.2 and 313.4 RoP and the Applicant has a legal interest in accordance with Rule 313.1. The Applicant has a direct and present interest in the outcome because it is entitled to conduct negotiations and agree licences which cover the Patent and to collect and distribute royalties which would be affected if the Patent were found invalid or not infringed. There is no abuse of process by the application to intervene. Allowing the intervention will not necessarily mean that NEC gets access to the negotiation information covered by the NDA. A separate objection relating to commercially sensitive bilateral discussions between NEC and TCL and that these becoming known to the Applicant would violate article 101 TFEU also failed. A time limit was set for the Applicant to lodge a statement of intervention. As an intervenor, the Applicant is to be treated as a party and can see documents on the file. However information that has been designated as confidential in TCL’s defence will only be available to the individual employees named by the Applicant to which TCL has not objected. Rule 262A.6 RoP requires that at least one natural person of the party must have access to that confidential information. As regards information about bilateral discussions between NEC and TCL, the Applicant will not have access to that information until further notice. The Judge-rapporteur exercised his discretion not to make a reference to the CJEU on questions raised by TCL. Note - the Applicant was represented by the same legal representatives as NEC. No objection was made to this. NEC had instructed its representatives not to forward any information relating to the bilateral discussions to the Applicant. The Judge-rapporteur’s order included that NEC’s representatives should forward the parties’ previous statements and court orders to the Applicant. [1] https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1160. Further related orders were also issued in the same matter on 2 October 2024: https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1161; https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1194; https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1196

Lisbon Local Division Refuses Provisional Injunction due to Delay

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Asustek Computer Inc, Arvato Netherlands B.V., Digital River Ireland Ltd. (UPC_CFI_317/2024) Decision of 15 October 2024 (ORD_52116/2024[1]) This judgment relates to the first case filed before the Lisbon Local Division, and is the first substantive decision from that court, which has up until now issued only procedural decisions related to the same litigation case. Ericsson sought a provisional injunction based on its patent EP 2819131 relating to voltage-controlled oscillators against three defendants. AsusTek is a Taiwanese company providing ASUS computers and parts; Arvato is a Netherlands shipping company acting as logistics partner to fulfil the business-to-consumer market for ASUS-branded products in the EU, including Portugal; and Digital River Ireland is an Irish company that acts as an authorized “re-seller” in respect of ASUS-branded products. Intel modules AX201 and AX211 contained in certain ASUS products were alleged to infringe the patent. Jurisdiction and competence The defendants did not dispute the competence of the UPC, but they did dispute the competence of the Lisbon local division. First, the defendants submitted that the Lisbon local division lacked competence because the allegedly infringing products are not capable of realising all the features of the patent claim. However, unsurprisingly, the Court held that a challenge to competence of the division can only be based on arguments against the territorial connection with the UPC Contracting Member State where the division is located, and the defendants did not challenge the territorial connection element. A defence based on the merits that no acts of infringement were committed cannot be used to challenge the competence of a specific division. Second, Arvato challenged the competence of the Lisbon local division on the basis that Article 33(1)(a) UPCA is expressly limited to infringement and does not mention or relate to intermediaries. The court disagreed and stated that Article 33(1)(a) UPCA establishes competence regarding the place where the actual or threatened infringement has occurred or may occur. This is an objective link based on the place of the infringement and not the status of the accused entity as infringer or intermediary. Thus it applies irrespective of whether the defendant is an infringer or an intermediary. To hold otherwise would lead to the consequence that the infringer and intermediary would have to be sued in different divisions – this is clearly not a result intended by the legal framework of the UPCA and its principles of efficiency, economy of means and legal certainty. According to the Enforcement Directive, intermediaries are entities whose services are used by the alleged infringer to infringe a patent, and Article 62(1) UPCA explicitly states that a provisional injunction can be granted “against an intermediary whose services are used by the alleged infringer” as well as against the alleged infringer themselves. Urgency The court stated that it must be able to objectively conclude that urgency exists and that there is a consequent need to grant measures to protect the applicant’s right. It noted that the applicant is expected to be diligent in seeking a remedy against the alleged infringer, having gathered all necessary evidence, from the moment the infringement began or from the time the applicant became aware of said infringement. Accordingly, if the applicant has been negligent in seeking provisional measures in a timely manner, the court may take this lack of diligence into consideration when assessing the measures requested in the preliminary injunction proceedings. An unreasonable delay in initiating the proceedings, taking into consideration the factual circumstances, could lead to a finding that the temporal urgency required for the ordering of provisional measures is lacking. The defendants stated that the alleged infringement began in 2019 regarding AX201, and 2021 regarding AX211, and the applicant had launched US ITC proceedings in October 2023. Moreover, Ericsson and AsusTek have been engaged in SEP licensing negotiations since 2018, and it would therefore be reasonable to expect Ericsson to pay special attention to ASUS products on the European market, specifically the modules in question as they have been subject to other infringement procedures. The court agreed and noted that it is the applicant who must convince the court that there is an urgent necessity for ordering provisional measures. The applicant had however been silent regarding the exact date when it became aware that ASUS products incorporated the accused modules, and referred solely to the date of the test purchase (5 May, 2024), not even arguing that date as being the one when it became aware of the modules. During the hearing the applicant’s representative stated that they had been instructed on 15 April 2024 to investigate the ASUS products, but the court doubted that this date (let alone the date of the test purchase) was the date when the applicant first became aware that the purchased products contained the modules. Therefore, the court concluded that the applicant had failed to indicate to the court the date on which it first became aware of the alleged infringement, which date marks the point from which any unreasonable delay must be evaluated. The court observed that the burden of proving urgency and due diligence in initiating proceedings is not satisfied if the applicant fails to provide the court with the exact date when it became aware of the infringement, particularly when the court has no other factual or objective temporal indication beyond the date the infringement commenced. Accordingly the court concluded that the applicant had failed to provide sufficient temporal elements enabling the court to assess its diligence in initiating proceedings. Consequently, the application for provisional measures was dismissed. Validity and Infringement Rather surprisingly, despite the urgency finding being dispositive of the application for provisional measures, the court considered validity and infringement. It rejected allegations of added matter, lack of novelty and lack of inventive step, and indicated that it considered the patent to be valid. It noted however that had it concluded otherwise, the auxiliary request filed by the applicant would have been inadmissible, since entertaining auxiliary requests is incompatible with the summary nature and urgency of provisional injunction proceedings. The court also considered that it was proved to the necessary standard (more likely than not) that the patent was infringed by the accused products. Moreover it concluded that AsusTek and Digital River were infringers and that Arvato would be liable as an intermediary. While strictly it was unnecessary for the court to indicate these substantive findings, perhaps it intended that its indications might guide the parties to a settlement without requiring an action on the merits to be filed. [1] https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1191

UPC rules that in house lawyers cannot act as UPC representatives

Suinno Mobile & AI Technologies Licensing Oy v Microsoft Corporation (UPC_CFI_164/2024) Order of 16 September 2024 (ORD_41174/2024)[1] This decision of the Paris Central Division of the UPC arose in the context of an infringement action brought by Suinno against Microsoft, and in particular an application by Suinno to keep certain evidence confidential. The court had ordered access to certain materials to be restricted to a confidentiality club consisting of Microsoft attorneys and directors, and Microsoft challenged this order. One of the issues Microsoft raised was whether, as was the case here for Suinno, where a person was the managing director and main shareholder of a party, could that person act as the UPC representative of that party, in view of the requirement of independence of representatives as set out in Article 48(5) UPC Agreement. The UPC accepted the need for confidentiality of the materials. More significantly, the court accepted that Article 48(5) UPC Agreement, which is modelled on Article 19 (5) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, precludes a party being represented by a lawyer that is employed by or financially dependent upon the party. While acknowledging that such lawyers can validly represent their employer in court where allowed under national legal systems, the UPC ruled that, analogous to the situation at the CJEU, parties must use the services of a third person who is authorised and cannot act themselves. Accordingly, the court held that the original application for confidentiality filed by Suinno was invalidly filed and therefore set aside the resulting order and declared the application inadmissible. However, it ordered that the restrictions on access to the materials be maintained. Permission to appeal was granted, and it will be interesting to see whether the Court of Appeal takes the same view. If so, this has significant consequences for access to justice at the UPC by smaller parties who may struggle to fund external litigation lawyers. [1] https://www.unified-patent-court.org/en/node/1104

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EIP launches Ampliphy

EIP has launched a new new strategic IP and legal service specifically for semiconductor chip designers and deep tech electronics and photonics companies called Ampliphy. The service is designed to help early stages companies develop effective IP str...

10x Genomics patent revoked

NanoString Technologies Europe Limited v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (UPC 252/2023) Decision of 17 October, 2024 (ORD_598480/2023[1]) This decision from the Central Division in Munich relates to EP2794928 belonging to President and Fe...

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EIP launches Ampliphy

EIP has launched a new new strategic IP and legal service specifically for semiconductor chip designers and deep tech electronics and photonics companies called Ampliphy. The service is designed to help early stages companies develop effective IP str...

10x Genomics patent revoked

NanoString Technologies Europe Limited v. President and Fellows of Harvard College (UPC 252/2023) Decision of 17 October, 2024 (ORD_598480/2023[1]) This decision from the Central Division in Munich relates to EP2794928 belonging to President and Fe...

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